In 2023, Cleveland had 14 runners thrown out at home plate. That was the final season with Terry Francona at the helm, and while we all expected change, I doubt any of us expected the size of pivot, as the Guards were suddenly cresting to 20. And fewer of us would have said that was a good thing.

The Winds of Change

Under Francona, the Guards played traditional, gentleman’s baseball. The guys were pretty kind and didn’t do stupid pranks (Josh Naylor notwithstanding), and they played clean ball. They also were basically average when it came to being thrown out at home plate.

In 2024, we changed up a lot in The Land. Tito retired and Mike Sarbaugh, after a decade as the Third Base coach, was released as well. Stephen Vogt, an outsider to the organization, was the new manager, and Rouglas Odor came up from Double-A Akron to coach third.

With the new managers came a new style of play. Or rather, a style of play that has always been beloved by fans: Goblin Ball.

Cleveland never really has been a long ball team, and while we have some amazing hitters like Jim Thome and José Ramirez, the 2020s have been more of a solid group of slap hitting shit goblins. Shitty singles leading to stretched out doubles, stealing bases, and bunting, Cleveland won with grit.

The Winds of Chaos

The most obvious of the gritty changes was the runners thrown out at home.

The Major League Baseball public databases aggregate total Outs at Home (OAH), bundling in guys thrown out from third along side guys stretching a double or trying to score from first. A little work has to be put in to understand the Guardians’ aggressive “third-to-home” change, and just how chaotic things got.

In 2025, Cleveland consistently ranked near the very top of the league in overall outs recorded at home plate. While league averages for outs at home usually hover around 10 to 14 for an entire season, the Guardians blew past that. In that year, the Guards were frequently making multiple outs at the plate in single calendar months during their peak aggressive stretches.

The coaching staff openly admitted that a high number of those outs came directly from the third-base coach. Odor was sending runners from third on shallow flies or infield contact plays which many of us fans noticed and began to question. While the Guards argued it was a calculation for playing high-pressure ball, and trying to nudge the defense into making a mistake, it resulted in 18 or 22 outs at the plate. Depending on how you count. Either way, that’s a monumental number of potential runs lost.

The Overcorrection of Chaos

This season, the numbers are wildly different. Looking only at the first half of 2025 and 2026, the data is telling:

Year	Outs at Home (OAH)	Total Runs Scored	Players Left on Base (LOB)
2025	13	382	612
2026	3	355	658

Dropping from 13 OaH to 3 is a 77% reduction in aggressive baserunning. Instead of dialling things back, Rugy and Vogter slammed on the brakes. On paper, cutting down on “outs at home” looks like smart, disciplined baseball. But the reality is that we’re stranding more players on base. 27 fewer runs and we created a false economy.

Opposing defense barely has to worry because they know the Guards won’t be aggressive once they’re in scoring position, which lets them position in ways that are advantageous to a double play. If you know the guy on third won’t run , you don’t have to protect and keep the infield in, further neutering any chance of clutch hitting.

Clutch Thrives in Chaos

When the Guards plays “Goblin Ball” (hat tip to Pinstripe Alley for coining that phrase in 2022), the opposing defenses feel it. Infielders have to creep in an extra step, shortstops will cheat a bit closer to the second-base bag to prevent the jump, and catchers tense up.

By forcing the defense to play with a higher state of anxiety, the offense creates bigger holes. A ground ball that is a routine out against a standard, relaxed defense suddenly becomes a “clutch” RBI single because the second baseman was a step out of position trying to hold a runner.

Sounds like how the Guards were doing last year, doesn’t it?

Clutch hitting isn’t just about the batter; it’s about what the pitcher is dealing with. When a team is a threat to execute a suicide squeeze, run a delayed double-steal, or dash home on a ball in the dirt, the pitcher cannot fully focus on executing his pitch. He is rushing his delivery, checking his mirrors, and throwing more predictable, high-velocity fastballs just to try to get the ball to the catcher quickly.

Without that chaos, the opposing pitcher relaxes. The catcher can call a for low-stress sequence to execute an easy strikeout or even a shallow fly that is perfectly safe.

It also puts a massive burden on the hitters. Now the entire weight of getting that guy home from third is at the plate, because he must get a hit, or at least a deep fly ball. Right now, with two of our best long ball guys out, the fragile rookies are shouldering that.

If we put that chaos back on the table, the pressure moves back to the defense. The hitter just has to get the ball in play, or get a solid contact crack, and the chaos of the bases will handle the rest. In short, aggressive baserunning is the safety net for a power-shy or slumping lineup.

Calculate the Chaos

It wasn’t until July 4th that we started to see some aggressive baserunning again. Rocchio stole second and then got tagged out stealing third. Kwan legged it out for a triple and got caught in a run-down that allowed Bazzana to turn his single into a double. Watson stole second and third in the same at bat. The pressure hit the White Sox and while non of those moments changed the score, you could see how the Sox were watching more carefully.

Coming back from the Break, I hope to see more aggressive baserunning. We can’t get men from home if we don’t try, and what we’ve been doing clearly isn’t working well enough. Let’s bring back the chaos of Goblin Ball!